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Development of the Thai Automotive Industry
The industry has passed through two distinct phases -an import substitution phase, followed by an export phase. During the import substitution phase (1960 to 1997) , the output of the automotive industry fluctuated with domestic demand. Output remained below 100,000 units per year until 1983 but expanded during the decade of economic boom from 1987 to 1996, when real GDP grew at almost 10 per cent per year, stimulating domestic demand (Warr 2005) . Output reached just over half a million units in 1996, almost entirely for the domestic market. With the collapse of demand resulting from the AFC, output plummeted to just over one fourth of this level in 1998. Over the next two decades, the policy changes and infrastructure investments described below produced a resurgence of output, reaching around 2 million units in 2015.
2 Figure 1 shows that the export share of this output grew dramatically from almost zero in 1997 to over 60 per cent in 2015.
In 2014, automotive exports earned US$33.6 billion, 16 per cent of total merchandise exports and 19 per cent of total manufactured goods exports. Table 1 shows that, of this total, just over half was export of vehicles and the remainder parts and components. Total automotive imports were US$13.5 billion, of which only 15 per cent was vehicles and the remainder parts and components. Around a quarter of all vehicle exports were to other ASEAN countries (as a result of the 1992 ASEAN Free Trade Agreement) and a further quarter to Australia (reflecting the 2005 Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement). Perhaps surprisingly, other ASEAN countries are the largest source for Thailand's vehicle imports, followed by the EU and Japan. Other ASEAN countries are the main destination for parts and components exports, followed by Japan and the United States. Value-added derived from Thailand's automotive industry is summarized in Figure 2 . From just over 5 per cent of manufacturing value-added prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, this value-added share had doubled to 10 per cent by 2014. The industry's employment share within manufacturing is estimated at roughly 4 per cent; the difference between this and its value-added share reflects the high capital intensity of the automotive sector. Commercial vehicles, primarily one-ton pick-ups, currently represent 60 per cent of Thailand's total vehicle output, the same proportion as three decades earlier ( Figure 3) .
A striking feature of the Thai industry is revealed in Figure 4 . The imported input content of vehicles produced in Thailand has declined steadily since the early 1990s. This decline was occurring already, prior to the abolition of local content requirements (LCRs) in 2000 and continued thereafter until around 2005. The moderate increase since then is due to the high electronics content of vehicles, requiring more sophisticated imports. In 2014, the value (in nominal U.S. dollars) of imported inputs per vehicle was only 55 per cent of its level in 2000, when local content requirements were abolished.
Earlier studies confirm that the development of the automotive industry has produced spillover benefits to other industries too, such as plastics, metallic industries (including casting and forging) through backward linkages from carmakers to local suppliers (Kohpaiboon 2007).
Finally, Figures 5 and 6 compare Thailand's automotive production and export performance with neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia. The main difference between these three countries was in policy. Malaysia and Indonesia were both committed to national car policies. Foreign ownership was restricted and local content requirements were enforced, as in Thailand prior to 1997. In 1999, Thailand's vehicle output was only slightly larger than Malaysia's but, by 2015, it had reached more than three times that of 0  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 FIGURE 4 Thailand: Value of Imported Parts per Locally Assembled Vehicle (US$ million/1,000 units) Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia: 1999-2014 (units) Source: Authors' compilation from UN Comtrade database, using the WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) website (http://wits.worldbank.org/) 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 FIGURE 5 Automobile Production in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia: 1999-2014 Malaysia. The comparison is even more dramatic in the case of exports. Malaysia's automotive exports have grown only marginally compared with Thailand's. Indonesia has performed better than Malaysia in both respects, but not as well as Thailand.
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Thailand's Policy Environment for Automotive Development
Infrastructure Policy: The Eastern Seaboard Economic Corridor
By the mid-1980s, it was apparent that the Bangkok port was inadequate to support heavy manufacturing within Thailand. Not only was the port upstream on the Chao Phraya River and unable to receive large ocean-going container ships directly, requiring transshipment of cargoes on smaller vessels, but its road connection to industrial areas passed through Bangkok's notoriously congested traffic. Japanese expertise and financial support were important in designing a new port area, 75 km to the southeast of Bangkok, that came to be called the Eastern Seaboard Scheme, centred on the new port of Laem Chabang (Doner 1991) . The scheme was connected by road to the large Map Ta Phut petrochemical complex, planned further to the south at Rayong and also served by a deep-water port. The intention was that the new port at Laem Chabang would accommodate ocean-going container vessels and thereby support the development of heavy manufacturing within Thailand, rather than just the garments, electronics and other light manufacturing that was already important (Banomyong 2010) . It is notable that the planning documents of the time did not assume or anticipate that the resulting industrial development would take the form of export-oriented automotive production, though it was an obvious possibility. The new port was designed to support heavy industry in general, rather than any particular industry.
The port itself was accompanied by large-scale public investments in highways connected to the port and upgraded electricity, telecommunications and water supplies along this highway system. The government also encouraged development of privately operated and financed industrial estates along the highway system connected to the Laem Chabang port. Aside from a small publicly owned industrial estate adjacent to the port, the development of industrial estates was left to the private sector. These industrial estates were not confined to automotive-related production, but included the full range of Thailand's manufactured exports. Within these estates, their private operators provided local electricity connections to the public grid, made industrial land available for sale or lease and, in many cases, offered standard factory buildings for lease to foreign or domestic firms.
The term "economic corridor" refers to an integrated network of infrastructure, including -but not confined to -transport infrastructure, providing "connections between economic nodes or hubs" (Brunner 2013 ). The port, together with the industrial area immediately adjacent to it might be considered a hub, but the highway system connected to it, with infrastructure investments in electricity and water located along this highway system created an economic corridor consisting of the outskirts of Bangkok itself and the seven additional provinces lying in a semi-circle to the east and north of Bangkok, all linked to the Laem Chabang port. 3 This transport and infrastructure corridor facilitated the growth of both final automotive assemblers as well as manufacturers of automotive parts. The final assemblers were all foreign-owned, mostly Japanese. 4 The parts and components manufacturers included both foreign firms (mainly Japanese) and many smaller Thai firms.
This study finds that the development of the cost-reducing economic corridor was instrumental in the success of the export-oriented Thai automotive sector since 2000. In conjunction with other policy changes described below, the publicly provided transport linkages, electricity supply and water supply facilities developed under the programme facilitated linkages between final manufacturers (mostly foreign) and parts and components suppliers operating with Thailand (both foreign and locally-owned), and connected them to the international market. The publicly provided corridor enabled the development of privately financed industrial estates along the corridor, within which both final assemblers and parts and components suppliers could locate profitably (Aveline-Dubach 2010).
Trade Policy
The Thai government's trade policy towards the automotive industry has passed through two distinct phases -an import substitution phase, lasting from the early 1960s to around 1997; and an export facilitation phase, from 1997 to the present. The major policy initiatives within these two phases are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 , respectively. Phase (1960 Phase ( to 1997 : During the early 1960s, domestic motor vehicle assembly was encouraged as a substitute for imported fully assembled vehicles through a system of tariff rates that increased through the decade, supplemented by quantitative LCRs from 1974 onwards. These LCRs were set at 45 per cent in 1982 and increased to 54 per cent in 1986. By the end of the 1980s, tariffs on completely built up (CBU) and completely knocked down (CKD) passenger motor vehicles were 150 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively. The automotive sector was the most heavily protected component of the Thai economy. In addition, foreign manufacturers producing in Thailand were required to operate in joint ventures with domestic partners. 
Import Substitution
1989
Ceiling on production capacity of existing assembly plans lifted.
1990
Abolished restrictions on domestic production of series and models. Replaced quantitative import restriction (including the ban on imports of CBUs under 2.3 litres) on passenger cars with tariffs.
1991
Reduced tariffs on all types of CBUs and CKD kits: CBUs over 2.3 litres from 300 per cent to 100 per cent; CBUs under 2.3 litres from 180 per cent to 60 per cent; CKDs for cars, pick-ups and vans from 112 per cent to 20 per cent. Required use of locally produced diesel engines for 1-ton pick-up trucks.
1992
Exempted pick-up trucks from exercise tax.
1993
Ban on new assembly plants lifted.
1995
Reduced CKD tariffs from 20 per cent to 2 per cent.
Notes: CKD means completely knocked-down; CBU means completely built-up; LCR means local content requirement.
Source: Based on Kohpaiboon (2015).
During the 1990s, these high rates of protection were gradually reduced. Under the reform-oriented government of Anand Panyarachun (1991 to 1992), tariff rates on all types of CBUs and CKD kits were reduced to one-third of their previous levels and all quantitative restrictions on vehicle imports were converted to tariffs. CKD tariffs were further reduced in 1995. In 1993, consistent with Thailand's commitments under the WTO Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement, it was announced that restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic automotive manufacturing would be removed by 1997, making Thailand the first developing country to do so. By the time of the Asian Financial Crisis in July 1997, Thailand's automotive sector remained almost entirely import-substituting, but less heavily protected than it had been through the 1960s to the 1980s. Phase (1997 to present) . The capital outflows that caused the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) produced a foreign exchange emergency for Thailand, making it imperative that greatly increased levels of foreign investment be attracted. In the case of the automotive sector, this meant that the 1993 commitment to abolish restrictions on foreign ownership of automotive manufacturers located in Thailand could not be postponed, despite desperate opposition from the Thai joint venture partners of foreign producers. Many of these local firms were heavily indebted and had little chance of avoiding bankruptcy.
Export Facilitation
A second crucial policy shift was the decision to abolish LCRs for domestically located final assemblers. This too was bad news for many Thai parts producers whose existence was owed to the LCRs. The decision was announced in advance of its implementation in 2000, and in 1999 tariffs on CKD vehicles were raised from 20 per cent to 35 per cent to cushion against the impact on local parts producers. Only a few efficient Thai parts producers survived. But many small Thai manufacturing firms producing automotive parts for larger component systems emerged over the next few years. Phase, 1997 Phase, -2015 Phase, 1997 Abolished local ownership requirement on foreign-invested projects (announced 1993; implemented 1997).
1999
Raised tariffs on CKD vehicles from 20 per cent to 30-35 per cent to cushion against the potential adverse impact of impending LCR abolition.
2000
Abolished local content requirement.
2003
Tariff preferences under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement came into full effect: import duties applicable to intra-ASEAN trade down to 0-5 per cent.
2007
Launch of "Eco-car project Phase 1" by providing investment incentives for producing small passenger vehicles. The key investment incentive is low excise tax rate (17 per cent as opposed to 30 per cent for usual passenger vehicles). Five carmakers were approved, including Toyota, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Suzuki and Honda.
2014
Launch of "Eco-car project Phase 2". Another five firms were approved. They included Nissan, Toyota, Mitsubishi, Ford and General Motors. Four more were to be approved (Honda, Suzuki, MG and Volkswagen).
Notes: CKD means completely knocked-down; CBU means completely built-up. Source: Based on Kohpaiboon (2015).
The AFC contributed to the political feasibility of these liberalization reforms in two ways. First, by bankrupting about three-quarters of the domestic firms dependent on the pre-existing LCR policy, it destroyed most of the political opposition to liberalization (Doner 2009 ). Second, the crisis produced a severe balance of payments crisis at the macroeconomic level, leaving the government desperate to promote exports regardless of opposition from remaining domestic rent-seekers. The AFC was devastating for the Thai people, but it is ironic that without it these radical liberalizations may have been infeasible. 5 It has been claimed that the earlier LCR scheme encouraged the development of Thai parts producers and that this paid off during the export phase (Doner 2009; Natsuda and Thoburn 2013) . This argument is difficult to reconcile with the huge turnover in Thai parts and components manufacturing that occurred from 2000 onwards. The parts and components manufacturers that were important during the early phase of the export expansion were newly arrived, fully foreign-owned, and closely linked to the major Japanese assemblers. The Thai firms that had developed under the LCR included many inefficient rent-seekers, few of which survived the AFC, the abolition of the LCR scheme and the entry of fully foreign-owned parts producers. 6 New, more efficient Thai firms later emerged, working closely with the new foreign-owned entrants, but this cannot reasonably be attributed to the earlier LCRs.
The large depreciation of the Thai currency resulting from the AFC made production for export more profitable. Both Indonesia and Malaysia experienced large currency depreciations at the same time as Thailand. But unlike Thailand, they did not make the policy adjustments necessary to make exportoriented automotive production attractive. The large manufacturers were already in Thailand. To export, they needed to scale up their production, which they did, based on huge corporate investments in plant and equipment. Fully foreign-owned parts suppliers with close links to the major assemblers soon entered the country. Fortuitously, the infrastructure needed to support large-scale production for export -including the port facilities, roads connected to them, electricity and water supplies -was already largely in place, in the form of the Eastern Seaboard scheme.
The Coexistence of Tariffs and Exports
An issue raised in the literature is the apparent puzzle that, despite the Thai automotive industry's export orientation since 2000, high tariffs on vehicle imports remain in place. Indeed, Thailand's automotive tariffs remain among the highest within ASEAN, averaging around 44 per cent for vehicles and 10.4 per cent for parts (Kohpaiboon 2015) . Natsuda and Thoburn (2013) conclude from these observations that import substitution policies are consistent with export promotion. The account presented in this study is different.
To explain the coexistence of these two phenomena, it is necessary to distinguish between: (a) the types of vehicles produced within Thailand for export -small-to-medium sized, non-luxury passenger vehicles and one-ton pick-ups -and (b) the larger, luxury passenger vehicles that are assembled within Thailand from imported CKD kits or imported as CBU vehicles for sale in the domestic market, but which are not exported. For brevity, these two categories are referred to as economy and luxury vehicles, respectively. They are imperfect substitutes in final demand, permitting their prices to move differentially. Figure 7 depicts supply and demand for these two categories of vehicles, distinguishing between the situations roughly before and after 2000. Panel (a) depicts the market for economy vehicles. The pre-2000 scenario is shown by the demand function D and supply function S 1 . The world price is P * . An ad valorem tariff rate of t leads to a domestic price of P * (1+t) and imports of M 1 . There are no exports. Post-2000, infrastructure investments and the policy changes described above lead to large-scale capital investments within the industry, with the intention of exporting, and the supply function shifts to S 2 . Economy vehicles now become exports. Provided the domestic market is competitive, manufacturers will sell on the domestic market until the domestic price falls to P * , beyond which they will sell on the export market. The tariff is a tax on imports and if these vehicles were actually imported, they would be subject to it. But, because they are not imported, the tariff is irrelevant for them. Raising or lowering the rate of the tariff would have no effect on their domestic price. Luxury vehicles remain net imports but the level of imports declines, abstracting from the very real effects of rising incomes. Post-2000, the tariff remains relevant for luxury vehicles, because raising or lowering the tariff rate would affect their domestic prices, but the tariff is not relevant for economy vehicles.
The reported coexistence of high rates of tariff protection and exports is misleading, conflating two distinct commodity categories. The imported category for which the tariff is relevant (luxury vehicles) is not exported. The exported category (economy vehicles) is not imported and is unaffected by the tariff.
Some industry observers have suggested that Thailand's automotive industry is oligopolistic with regard to the domestic market. If so, the high import tariffs on economy vehicles could support that market structure by allowing Thai producers to exercise price discrimination between domestic and export markets. 8 The price discrimination argument assumes that Thai manufacturers collude to restrict domestic sales, because otherwise competition for the more lucrative domestic market would result in diversion of sales from export to the domestic market, eroding the price differential.
Price discrimination requires a tariff on imports of economy vehicles, because imports from elsewhere or re-import of vehicles exported from Thailand would otherwise destroy the price differential. It is clear that the existing tariff rates are well in excess of the levels required to achieve this outcome, a phenomenon known as "water in the tariff". It follows that even large percentage changes in tariff rates, upwards or downwards, would have no effect on the domestic price of economy vehicles.
One-ton Pick-ups: A National Product Champion?
A feature of the Thai automotive sector is the high proportion of commercial vehicles, especially one-ton pick-ups, in its output, as summarized in Figure 3 .
9 Pick-ups also represent a large share of automotive exports. To explain these observations, Natsuda and Thoburn (2013) postulate a form of industry policy they call "product champion (picking a winning type of vehicle)". 10 The authors contrast this with the Malaysian policy of creating a national champion firm. Unlike Malaysia, Thailand has not attempted to establish a national brand automotive producer. The incentive used to encourage production of oneton pick-ups in Thailand is said to be a lower rate of excise tax on one-ton pick-ups than on passenger vehicles (Natsuda and Thoburn 2013).
11
Pick-ups do attract a lower rate of domestic excise tax than other vehicles and this fact means that domestic demand for pick-ups is encouraged relative to other vehicles. But exports are exempt from excise taxes. Differences in excise tax rates accordingly provide no incentive to export one type of vehicle versus another. Yet one-ton pick-ups were the first vehicles exported from Thailand, as Natsuda and Thoburn (2013) point out, and constitute a higher proportion of Thailand's automotive exports than their share of the global market. Differences in domestic excise tax rates cannot be the explanation. Moreover, the excise tax policy dates to 1988, but as Figure 3 shows, one-ton pick-ups were already dominant in the output of the Thai automotive sector prior to that, at around 60 per cent of output, and despite some fluctuations driven by domestic demand, this proportion barely changed over the following three decades.
12
Some, but not all, Japanese automakers have chosen to concentrate their global production of pickups within Thailand, for strategic reasons of their own. As far as the domestic market was concerned, Thailand's domestic tax policies supported that outcome, mainly to benefit farmers and small businesses, both heavy users of these vehicles. But this was not "industry policy" and it had no bearing on export decisions. The "national product champion" story is apparently a myth.
Board of Investment incentive policy
Since the 1960s, Thailand's Board of Investment (BOI) has attempted to encourage the decentralization of manufacturing production away from the immediate vicinity of Bangkok. It defined three zones. Zone 1 included the five provinces immediately adjacent to Bangkok, including Samut Prakan, where Toyota is located. Zone 2 consisted of nine adjacent provinces, including Chonburi and Ayuthaya, where Mitsubishi, Ford, Mazda and Honda are located. Zone 3 was the remaining sixty-two of Thailand's seventy-six provinces, all more distant from Bangkok. Until 2013, the BOI used a combination of fiscal incentives to encourage relocation to outer provinces, especially to Zone 3. No automotive producer has ever located in Zone 3. Although there was a rationale for the government to encourage firms to locate in Zone 3, resting on the lower household incomes of the provinces concerned, poor infrastructure prevented it. The incentives offered were insufficient to overcome this drawback.
To some extent, the BOI incentive structure was at variance with the government's own infrastructure policy. The Eastern Seaboard scheme was explicitly intended to concentrate scarce infrastructure resources along the southeastern corridor connected to the Laem Chabang port, all within BOI's Zones 1 and 2. The purpose was to facilitate the development of manufacturing in this region. At the same time, the BOI was attempting, although unsuccessfully, to encourage manufacturing firms to locate in the outer provinces of BOI's Zone 3, where wages were lower but which were less well endowed with public infrastructure. The latter did not work and the decentralization objective was abandoned in 2013. The BOI's new system is intended to encourage high technology, skill-intensive investments. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will be important for the future of the automotive industry, but past experience is not encouraging that the BOI incentives will have much effect on firms' decisions.
Labour Supply and Land Acquisition
Issues of labour supply and land acquisition have been constraints on the development of the Eastern Seaboard economic corridor. The availability of trained technicians and engineers requires public investment and this has been insufficient. Land acquisition is an additional problem. Generally, foreigners are not allowed to own land in Thailand. Nonetheless, they can enjoy full property rights over land (100 per cent freehold ownership) within private industrial estates, whereas leasehold or joint ventures with local partners owning 51 per cent of the operation is commonly required in other Asian countries (Aveline-Dubach 2010).
The ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme
The ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO) is intended to encourage technology-based investments in ASEAN, and is open to any ASEAN-based company that is incorporated in and operating in an ASEAN country, with a minimum of 30 per cent ASEAN equity. Perhaps surprisingly, the scheme has been used by only one automotive firm (Toyota) and its major supplier (Denso), both of which are fully foreign-owned. Its impact on the development of the Thai automotive industry has apparently been negligible.
Analysis of the Industrial Census
Thailand's industrial census is available for the years 1997, 2007 and 2012, containing data collected in 1996, 2006 and 2011, respectively . The surveys will subsequently be referred to by the latter years, indicating the years of data collection, rather than the years of census publication. The data contained in these surveys relate to plant level, rather than firm level observations. Since firm identification is not recorded systematically, conversion of the data into panel format is not possible. The industries of interest in this study are ISIC 3410 "Manufacture of motor vehicles" and ISIC 3430 "Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines". Although the data are intended to cover all firms producing in these industries, the actual response rate has varied widely across years. This was particularly important in the case of the 2011 census, which was severely disrupted by flooding in central Thailand. Many firms did not respond. For example, the data indicate that the number of large final assembly plants declined substantially from 2006 to 2011. In fact, no such firm left the industry, but many did not respond to the 2011 survey. For this reason, the comparison between the 1996 and 2006 surveys is the most reliable. Table 4 summarizes the responses to the three censuses. Vehicle assembly includes two quite different kinds of firms: large, multinational car manufacturers engaging in significant manufacturing within Thailand and producing within very large plants; and small, Thai-owned assemblers producing for niche markets within Thailand. The latter group includes firms assembling buses and certain types of trailer trucks using imported new or used engines. These firms undertake very little actual manufacturing activity within Thailand.
Descriptive Summary
The large, foreign-owned vehicle assemblers are each linked to numerous parts suppliers, that tend to be small to medium-sized and include both foreign and domestically owned firms. New parts supplier plants tend to locate in the area surrounding car assembly plants. For example, the number of part supplier plants located in Samut Prakarn province increased from 56 in 1996 to 122 and 144 plants in 2006 and 2011, respectively . These parts suppliers have been crucial to the development of the Thai automotive sector and Table 5 provides further summary details on them. Table 6 does the same for final assembly plants. For the purposes of these two tables, all firms containing any foreign ownership are classified as "foreign-owned". The category "Thai-owned" therefore means a firm that has no foreign ownership. Among parts suppliers, domestically owned firms are smaller and more labour-intensive, as measured by output per worker.
Turnover among firms is higher among the Thai-owned input suppliers. This is indicated by the average age of plants responding to the surveys in the three years covered. In 1996, the average age of Thai-owned plants exceeded the average age of foreign-owned plants, but by 2011, this difference had reversed. Over the five years between 2006 and 2011, the average age of foreign-owned input suppliers increased by roughly five years, but that of Thai-owned suppliers increased by only half as much, even though the number of Thai firms increased only marginally. Many Thai firms had left the industry to be replaced by others. Tables 5 and 6 reveal the vast difference in sample coverage among these three censuses, especially for foreign car makers, which are a central interest in our analysis.
Econometric Analysis
The comparison between foreign-owned and domestically owned input suppliers is important for understanding the development of the Thai automotive industry. These linkages are studied econometrically below, by pooling the data for the two rounds of the census 1996 and 2006. For the reasons explained above, 2011 data were considered unreliable and were not used. Dummy variables were used to indicate the year of the survey. The following questions will be addressed in relation to auto parts producers:
1. Is there a differential in output per firm between foreign and domestic producers? If so, has this differential changed over time? 2. Is the capital/labour ratio higher for foreign firms than domestic firms? If so, has this differential changed over time? 3. Is value-added per worker higher among foreign than domestic firms? If so, has this differential changed over time?
For the purposes of these regressions, all nominal money values were converted to real values using price deflators at the four-digit ISIC level. In each of the three simple regression equations estimated, the dependent variable is expressed in natural logarithms. The independent variables include a foreign ownership dummy -to detect any influence ownership might have -denoted F below. Intercept and slope year dummies are used to capture the year of observation. The intercept dummy variable for 2006 is denoted D06 and the slope dummy variable for the interaction variables between foreign ownership Source: Authors' compilations from National Statistical Office, Industrial Census, 1997 Census, , 2007 Census, and 2012 and the year of observation, is denoted by F×D06. Numbers in parentheses shown below the estimated coefficients are t-statistics. The superscripts *, ** and *** indicate that the null hypothesis (that the true coefficient is zero) is rejected at the 90 per cent, 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels, respectively. F-tests relate to the joint null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. Source: Authors' compilations from National Statistical Office, Industrial Census, 1997 Census, , 2007 Census, and 2012 In equation (1) the dummy variable for foreign ownership is positive and significant. Foreign firms tend to be larger than domestic firms. The interaction effect variable for the year 2006 is positive and significant, indicating that the output difference between foreign and domestic firms increased over time. Equation (2) indicates that foreign firms are more capital intensive than domestic firms and that the difference is significant. There was no significant decline in this difference over time. Equation (3) controls for capital intensity (K/L), to ask whether foreign firms are more productive than domestic firms. The coefficient of the foreign ownership dummy is positive and significant, so the answer is yes. Moreover, although average value added per worker declined over time, the interaction effect variable for 2006 is positive and significant, indicating that the difference between the productivity of foreign and domestic parts suppliers increased over time.
The above findings do not support the notion that the entry of foreign input suppliers after 1997 had positive spillover effects on domestic suppliers. The differential between the two groups in output per firm, capital intensity and labour productivity was significant in each case and did not decline over time. Did the long period of local content requirements prior to 1997 have lasting effects on the productivity of the domestic input suppliers, relative to foreign suppliers? The above findings indicate that the answer is no.
Productivity Effect of Improved Public Infrastructure
Beginning with the development of the Laem Chabang port, the Thai government invested in infrastructure upgrades in the eight provinces close to the Eastern Seaboard scheme (Bangkok, Samut Prakarn, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Ayutthaya, Chon Buri, Rayong and Chachoengsao), with the objective of improving the investment climate for manufacturing firms, including -but not solely -automotive final assemblers and parts suppliers. These infrastructure upgrades consisted of investments in improved roads, industrial capacity electricity supplies, water supplies and telecommunications. Infrastructure upgrades in the other sixty-eight provinces were significantly less extensive. If they were successful, the infrastructure investments should have raised labour productivity relative to those areas not receiving similarly favourable treatment. The Industrial Census data can be used to investigate whether the intended effect was achieved. The labour productivity inside and outside the improved infrastructure regions is calculated. This is done for each of the three years of the Industrial Census and for both foreign and local firms. Table 7 performs these calculations for final assemblers. The Industrial Census records no foreign final assemblers outside the improved infrastructure region (the above eight provinces) in 1996 and 2011, so for foreign final assemblers the "Inside/Outside" comparison can be made only for 2006. The "Inside" mean for that year is more than three times the "Outside" mean. For local firms, the "Inside" mean is at least twice the "Outside" mean in each of the three years. Table 8 performs similar calculations for parts 4 4 3 suppliers. The means of labour productivity are again higher "Inside" than "Outside", except for foreign firms in 1996 and 2011, where the "Outside" means are higher.
Recalling that the Industrial Census is, in fact, a sample survey of only some firms, rather than a true census of all firms, it makes sense to ask whether these differences in the sample-based mean estimates of labour productivity are statistically significant. This is done in Table 9 . The analysis assumes that the sample is an unbiased random sample from the overall population of relevant firms. The null hypothesis is that true labour productivity for the full population is the same inside and outside the improved infrastructure regions. The alternative hypothesis is that "Inside" productivity is higher. This can be tested Notes: Labour productivity means value-added in million baht per worker. n.a. means no firms recorded in data.
Numbers not in parentheses refer to the sample excluding outliers. Outliers are defined as firms with recorded labour productivity greater than five times or less that one-fifth of the mean value. Numbers in parentheses refer to the full sample. "Inside" means factories located in the eight provinces with improved infrastructure: Bangkok, Samut Prakarn, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Ayutthaya, Chon Buri, Rayong and Chachoengsao. "Outside" means firms located in any of the other sixty-eight provinces. Source: Authors' calculations using data from National Statistical Office, Industrial Census, 1997 Census, , 2007 Census, and 2012 by calculating the t-statistic for the estimated mean difference and comparing it with the critical values from a one-tail t-test.
14 The last column of Table 9 summarizes the results. As explained above, comparisons cannot be made for foreign final assemblers for 1996 and 2011, because of the absence of "Outside" firms in the sample. For foreign assemblers, in 2006, labour productivity is significantly higher "Inside" than "Outside". This is also true for local final assemblers in all three years. Among parts suppliers, productivity is higher for foreign firms "Inside" than "Outside" in 2006, but not significantly different in the other two years. For local firms, "Inside" productivity is significantly higher in 1996 and 2006 but not significantly different Notes: Labour productivity means annual turnover in million baht per worker. n.a. means no firms recorded in data.
Numbers not in parentheses refer to the sample excluding outliers. Outliers are defined as firms with recorded labour productivity greater than five times or less that one-fifth of the mean value. Numbers in parentheses refer to the full sample. "Inside" means factories located in the eight provinces with improved infrastructure: Bangkok, Samut Prakarn, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Ayutthaya, Chon Buri, Rayong and Chachoengsao. "Outside" means firms located in any of the other sixty-eight provinces. Source: Authors' calculations using data from National Statistical Office, Industrial Census, 1997 Census, , 2007 Census, and 2012 in 2011. For the reasons discussed above, the 2012 Industrial Census (2011 data) is considered less reliable than that for the previous two rounds. Discounting those results, the conclusion is that the public investments in infrastructure significantly raised labour productivity among both final assemblers and parts suppliers, and for both foreign and local firms.
Conclusion: Explaining the Thai Experience
The impressive growth of Thailand's export-oriented automotive industry -both final vehicles and parts -has generated hundreds of thousands of well-paid manufacturing jobs that otherwise would not have existed. The industry developed within an automotive manufacturing corridor based on massive public infrastructure investments in the 1990s, known as the Eastern Seaboard scheme. The investment was far- Notes: The analysis tests the null hypothesis that the true population means are the same inside and outside the improved infrastructure areas. The alternative hypothesis is that the true means are higher inside. As in Tables 7  and 8 , n.a. means no firms recorded in the data. M1 and M2 are the sample means inside and outside the upgraded infrastructure regions, respectively, as shown in Tables 7 and 8 . The columns t (p) are the critical t-values for significance in a one-tailed t-test at the level p, where p = 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively. The column t est. is the computed t-statistic for the difference between sample means using the sample data shown in Tables 7 and 8 . In the column Result: -means that no test result can be provided because the sample data in Tables  7 and 8 are incomplete; *, ** and *** mean that the null hypothesis that the difference is zero is rejected at the 90 per cent, 95 per cent and 99 per cent confidence levels, respectively, in favour of the alternative hypothesis that labour productivity is higher in the improved infrastructure region; and n.s. means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at these significance levels. Source: Authors' calculations using data from National Statistical Office, Industrial Census, 1997 Census, , 2007 Census, and 2012 sighted but risky. It had a happy ending, but things could have been otherwise. It eventually generated large benefits for Thailand, but only after the disastrous 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis. Combined with crucial policy changes within the country, it made automotive production for export profitable. The key policy changes were abandonment of: (i) restrictions on foreign ownership; and (ii) local content requirements. The infrastructure development and policy reforms were jointly necessary for the export success. Without the policy reforms, the huge public infrastructure investments would have been underutilized because they required a scale of heavy industry production possible only through exports. But without the cost-reducing effects of the improved infrastructure, the policy reforms would not have attracted large-scale export-oriented investment. Development of the infrastructure supporting an efficient export gateway (the Laem Chabang port and the associated Eastern Seaboard corridor) was crucial, but this infrastructure development was not automotive industry-specific and the growth of the automotive sector was not anticipated by the planners concerned.
Neighbouring countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, were potential competitors in attracting foreign investment in automotive production for export. But they did not experience a similar automotive export boom because (1) they did not invest similarly in cost-reducing infrastructure improvements and (2) they did not adopt comparable policy reforms. These policy missteps among its competitors clearly contributed to Thailand's success.
Thailand's Board of Investment (BOI) had attempted for decades to use fiscal incentives to encourage manufacturers to locate in economically disadvantaged regions of the country. The BOI policy assumed that firms could be encouraged to locate wherever the workers lived. The Eastern Seaboard scheme, on the other hand, assumed that workers would move to wherever the jobs could be created most efficiently. The Eastern Seaboard scheme eventually worked, but the BOI policy failed and was abandoned in 2013. The lesson for other countries is that manufacturing firms cannot readily be induced to locate in regions preferred by governments but where infrastructure facilities are substandard even when seemingly generous tax incentives are offered as inducements.
Thailand avoided the failed "national car" policies of some of its neighbours, permitting full foreign ownership of vehicle manufacturing, but did not eliminate its high rates of protection of final vehicles. This study argues that these tariffs were largely irrelevant for the development of the export-oriented component of the automotive industry. Thailand liberalized input supplies by abolishing local content requirements, becoming an export platform, paradoxically facilitating higher, not lower, local content per vehicle. In addition, the volume of production was much higher than it otherwise would have been. The lesson for other countries is that local content schemes can be strongly counterproductive. Export-oriented manufacturers are averse to restrictions on their decisions on input procurement. They will attempt to source their parts locally when they can, but resist being compelled to do so. Following the relaxation of restrictions on foreign entry of input suppliers (1997), multinational enterprise (MNE) final assemblers often preferred domestically located, but foreign, tier-1 input suppliers. Not many of the existing indigenous input suppliers survived this period, but those that did mainly became tier-2 suppliers. The evidence does not support the claim that earlier local content requirements facilitated the development of export-oriented automotive production.
Thailand cannot (yet) be considered the "Detroit of the East" because its automotive industry remains largely foreign-owned, foreign-managed and dependent on design, engineering development and technical research occurring mainly in Japan. The export success of the industry reflects the Thai government's impressive institutional capacity in physical infrastructure development. But the industry also reflects a lack of capacity in human resource development. The limited availability of skilled workers remains a major industry problem and a constraint on deepening its domestic design and engineering content. Thailand will not become the "Detroit of the East" until this changes.
investors into national product champion production" (p. 414). According to the present authors' enquiries, this is incorrect. Corporate tax rates do not distinguish between automotive producers who produce one-ton pick-ups and those who do not. 12. The main exception was due to the temporary collapse in domestic demand for these vehicles during and immediately following the 1997-98 AFC. 13. A longer, working paper version of this paper (Warr and Kohpaiboon 2017, available online) contains detailed maps showing the location of final assembly and autoparts firms within the economic corridor in 1996 and 2006, based on the Industrial Census data. 14. The t-test is one-tailed because the alternative hypothesis is that labour productivity is higher inside than outside the improved infrastructure region, not just that it is different, which would correspond to a two-tailed test.
